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Europeanization through Violence? 
War Experiences and the Making of Modern Europe 
 
Robert Gerwarth & Stephan Malinowski 
 
in: Kiran Patel, Martin Conway (ed.), Europeanization in the Twentieth 
Century: Historical Approaches, Palgrave 2010/2011 (in print) 
 
DRAFT 
 
 
“Les universités européennes ont été le berceau de la civilisation.  
Mais il y a aussi une autre éducation européene,  
celle que nous recevons en ce moment:  
les pelotons d'exécution, l'esclavage, la torture, le viol –  
la destruction de tout ce qui rend la vie belle.  
C'est l'heure des ténèbres.”  
 
Romain Gary, Éducation européenne (1945) 
 
I 
 
Unlike the more ambivalent transnational concepts of ‘Americanization’ 
and ‘Globalization’, the increasingly popular term ‘Europeanization’ is 
generally used to describe unambiguously positive processes of political, 
socio-economic and cultural integration within the institutional framework 
of the European Union.1 Peaceful forms of cross-cultural encounter, 
shared values, free trade, transnational exchanges of ideas, a culture of 
compromise and increasing inter-state cooperation at various levels are, so 
it seems, at the heart of what we commonly perceive as ‘Europeanization’, 
a transnational process that culminated in the EU, a realm of peace and 
prosperity in which the demons of a nationalist past have become history.2  
                                                
1 See, for example: R. Harmsen and T. Wilson (2004), ‘Introduction: Approaches to 
Europeanization’, Yearbook of European Studies XIV, 13-26; T. Börzel and T. Risse 
(2006), ‘Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of European Union Politics’, in: K. E. 
Jorgensen et. al. (eds.), Handbook of European Union Politics (London), 483-504.  See, 
too: D. Dinan (2004), Europe Recast: A History of the European Union (Basingstoke).  
2 See, for example: P. Valéry (1924), Variété I (Paris) and K. Jaspers (1946), ‘Vom 
Europäischen Geist’, in: idem. (1958), Rechenschaft und Ausblick: Reden und Aufsätze 
(Munich), 275-311. O. Asbach (2004), ‘Die Erfindung des modernen Europa in der 
französischen Aufklärung’, Francia XXXI, 55-94; A. Pagden (ed.) (2002), The Idea of 
Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union (Cambridge and New York). 
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It has become commonplace to contrast this process with the 
violent upheavals and nationalist confrontations that characterised the late 
nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century – from colonial 
rivalry to wars within Europe – and to view ‘Europeanization’ as a lesson 
Europeans learnt from their violent and ultimately self-destructive pasts. 
Influential works by Tony Judt and James Sheehan, for example, have 
juxtaposed the divisive nature of nationalism, war, and destruction of 
Europe’s early twentieth-century on the one hand and European 
internationalisation with its emphasis on transnational discourses, peaceful 
conflict resolution, and cultural convergence on the other.3 
 There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with a historical 
interpretation in which the astonishingly swift reconstruction of post-war 
(Western) Europe and the indisputable successes of European integration 
are emphasised as remarkable achievements. On the other hand, however, 
a binary model of European conflict and ‘Europeanization’ can easily 
result in a somewhat unsatisfactory ‘happy history’ of European 
integration, a history which contrasts sharply with the shared European 
experiences of violence that shaped the lives of millions of Europeans. To 
be sure, wars and conflicts were by definition the result of difference and 
division and not, in the main, self-referentially European. States (mainly 
nation-states) were the agents in the military conflicts which is why their 
history has usually been written within national frameworks of analysis. 
Yet, as Ute Frevert has rightly pointed out, the two world wars also 
constituted genuinely transnational conflicts in which millions of people 
gathered intense experiences of (voluntary and involuntary) mobility and 
cross-border contacts.4 Between 1914 and 1945, and in parts of Europe 
until much more recently, ethnic conflicts, wars and civil wars, were 
indeed the most defining transnational experiences of border-crossing and 
inter-cultural exchange and they, too, contributed to a vast array of 
(intended or unintended) contacts and transfers of ideas and personnel 
across real or imagined borders as well as to the reordering of ‘mental 
                                                
3 T. Judt (2005), Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York and London), J. 
Sheehan (2008), Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern 
Europe (New York).  
4 U. Frevert (2005), ‘Europeanizing German History’, Bulletin of the German Historical 
Institute XXXVI, 9-31, particularly 13-15.  
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maps’.5  
 In assessing the unintended effects of these (often involuntary) 
contacts and border crossings on the process of Europeanization – 
understood here as a convergence of life experiences within Europe – we 
do not wish to dispute the primarily divisive nature of violence. Europeans 
obviously did not become more European as a result of violence. Yet if, as 
the editors of this volume emphasise in their introduction, 
‘Europeanization’ is not to be understood as a one-dimensional, 
teleological process that began in the ruins of war-torn Europe in 1945 
and ended with the creation of the supra-national EU, we should at least 
consider the possibility of viewing violence as a quintessential part of 
what René Girault and Hartmut Kaelble have emphasized as an important 
dimension of ‘Europeanisation’, namely l’Europe vécue, the Europe of 
shared experiences.6 Although it would go beyond the scope of this essay 
to offer a comprehensive analysis of the myriad ways in which violent 
experiences contributed to the process of ‘Europeanization’, we hope to 
offer suggestions for future empirical studies on the subject matter. 
To be sure, the idea that peaceful European integration, democracy 
and violence are not mutually exclusive has been challenged before. 
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer have pointed to the dialectic of 
progress while a number of historians have convincingly demonstrated the 
compatibility of and historical connections between European democracy 
and mass violence.7 As John Horne and others have pointed out the 
cultural and political currents generally identified as pillars of European 
civilisation – Christianity, the Enlightenment, science, and democracy – 
have also contributed to war and revolution, often decisively.8  
Furthermore, as Daniel Schönpflug and Martin Aust have recently argued, 
                                                
5 C. Conrad (2002), ‘Mental Maps’, Geschichte und Gesellschaft XXVIII, 340-514. 
6 H. Kaelble (2007), ‘Europäisierung’, in: M. Middell (ed.), Dimensionen der Kultur- 
und Gesellschaftsgeschichte (Leipzig), 73-89, here 77f; idem (1995), 
‘Europabewußtsein, Gesellschaft und Geschichte: Forschungsstand und 
Forschungschancen’, in: idem, R. Hudemann, and K. Schwabe (eds.), Europa im Blick 
der Historiker (Munich), 1-30. 
7 M. Horkheimer and T. W Adorno (1947), Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York). M. 
Mazower (1998), Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (London). M. Mann 
(2005), The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (New York and 
Cambridge). 
8 J. Horne (2007), ‘War and Conflict in Contemporary European History, 1914-2004’, in: 
K. H. Jarausch and T. Lindenberger (eds.), Conflicted Memories: Europeanizing 
Contemporary Histories (New York and Oxford), 81-95, here 83. 
Gerwarth / Malinowski, Europeanization through Violence? 
 4 
some of the most enduring transnational learning processes in twentieth 
century-Europe were prompted by mutual hostility, conflict, and war.9 
Recent publications on Nazism have furthermore demanded a 
‘Europeanized perspective’ on the history of the Third Reich, not in order 
to downplay German responsibility for the Second World War or the 
Holocaust, but to address transnational connections brought about by 
intra-European fascist collaboration, expulsion and the redrawing of 
geographical and mental maps that can only be explained insufficiently 
from a nation-centric perspective.10 A recent example of the fruitfulness 
of such a perspective is Mark Mazower’s Hitler’s Empire which 
investigates the ill-fated and ultra-violent attempts at Nazi Empire-
building from a genuinely transnational and ‘Europeanized’ perspective.11 
Our essay will build on this relatively recent body of scholarship 
and our own research interests in order to formulate some tentative 
hypotheses about the connections between violence and (de-
)Europeanization. By discussing the ‘Europeanizing’ effects of two 
violent projects of epic dimensions, European colonialism and the two 
world wars, we engage with what one might call the dark side of 
transnational history in order to promote an ambivalent concept of 
‘Europeanization’ that weaves together histories of extremely violent 
encounters and border-crossings and those of economic success, 
democratic reorientation, and collective recovery. In other words: our 
purpose is not to replace the meta-narrative of peace and prosperity at the 
heart of Europeanization with a dysfunctional version of the European 
civilisation thesis in which violence becomes the kit of European identity. 
Instead we aim to emphasise multiple dynamics and to complicate the 
‘happy’ image of Europeanization that still dominates in scholarly and 
political debates. At the same time, we aim to test the usefulness of 
                                                
9 M. Aust and D. Schönpflug (eds.) (2007), Vom Gegner lernen: Feindschaften und 
Kulturtransfers im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt am Main). For a 
similar model of trans-national learning processes, see: W. Schivelbusch (2003), The 
Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery (London). 
10 See: K. K. Patel (2007), ‘In Search of a Transnational Historicization: National 
Socialism and its Place in History’, in: Jarausch / Lindenberger (eds.), Conflicted 
Memories (New York and Oxford), 96-116; A. Bauerkämper (2007), ‘The Ambiguities 
of Transnationalism: Fascism in Europe between Pan-Europeanism and Ultra-
Nationalism, 1919-1939’, Bulletin of the German Historical Institute London IXXX, 43-
67.  
11 M. Mazower (2008), Hitler’s Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe (London and 
New York: Allen Lane). 
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‘Europeanization’ as a transnational conceptual approach for the 
investigation of aspects of European history that are often perceived as the 
direct opposite of ‘Europeanization’.  
We are aware that it could be objected that the dynamics described 
in this essay were ultimately not distinctively European, but increasingly 
manifest in different forms across the globe. This is only partly true, 
however, since their origin was distinctly European even if they were 
subsequently globalized. Furthermore we believe that Europe should not 
be treated as a sealed-off entity, but as a constellation of states whose 
peculiar and often violent interaction with each other (and the rest of the 
world) gave it its distinct character in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. ‘European’ identity was generally most strongly 
developed when it was threatened by real or imagined ‘others’, be they 
America, African immigrants, or ‘Asian’ Bolshevism. In this essay, we 
will distinguish between aspects of extra-European ‘Europeanization’, that 
is: imperial projects aimed at wielding power over non-European 
territories and populations, and projects that contributed to the violent 
‘Europeanization’ of Europe between 1914 and 1945.   
 
II 
 
The ‘golden age’ of colonialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century is generally viewed as a period in which European rivalries were 
decisively exacerbated, contributing to the clash of European nations in 
1914.12 It is often suggested that only the process of decolonization after 
the Second World War helped to diffuse nationalist rivalries on the 
colonial periphery while at the same time giving important impulses for 
European economic integration.13 However, without denying that 
colonialism was clearly also a factor in de-Europeanization, it also 
constituted a shared European experience characterized by transnational 
learning processes with respect to the (generally violent) treatment of non-
European natives and the construction of colonial identities of white 
                                                
12 P. M. Kennedy (1987), The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 
(London); E. J. Hobsbawm (1987), The Age of Empire, 1875-1914 (New York).  
13 Kaelble, ‘Europeanization’, 85. The European economic reorientation away from the 
colonies and towards the European market can be observed fro a number of countries. 
See, for example, for France: D. Lefeuvre (2005), Chère Algérie: La France Et Sa 
Colonie, 1930-1962 (Paris).   
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supremacy. In this context, the following section will emphasize four 
aspects of colonial history that seem particularly relevant to the subject of 
‘Europeanization’: colonialism’s character as a transnational European 
project; the convergence of colonial experiences of dominance and 
violence; the repercussions of these experiences on Europe itself; and, 
finally, the evolving patterns of mutual observation and transnational 
knowledge transfers. 
From Christopher Columbus, an Italian trained in Portugal in the 
fifteenth century and financed by Spain to ‘discover’ the New World to 
the transnationally coordinated wars of European decolonisation in the 
1950s and 1960s, colonialism was an experience many European states – 
from Portugal to Britain, Belgium to France - shared. Transnational 
similarities in regard to the methods of colonial rule and oppression - from 
economic pressure to systematic mass murder – testified to the degree to 
which this transnational project of subjugation rested on mutual 
observation and international learning processes.14 In consequence, 
violent conquest, the maintenance of colonial rule, and, in the twentieth 
century, the ‘modernizing mission’, followed similar pan-European 
patterns which not only led to the familiar European rivalries but also to 
contacts and shared learning experiences.15  
When entering the colonial realm, Europeans often left their 
specific national contexts behind and formed new groups with other 
Europeans rather than with their ‘colonial peoples’. The crew of the 
Congo steamer on which Joseph Conrad’s protagonist Marlow penetrated 
the Heart of Darkness, for example, was just as ‘European’ as the non-
fictional crew which brought the Polish-British anthropologist, Bronislaw 
Malinowski, to Papua a few years later.16 Like so many other scholars 
active in colonial settings, Malinowski’s expedition relied heavily on 
European infrastructures and European cooperation.17 The German 
                                                
14 T. Todorov (1984), The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other (New York). 
15 This also applies to the most violent chapters of colonial expansion: genocide. See: A. 
D. Moses (ed.) (2008), Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation and Genocide 
and World History (Oxford and New York); idem, ‘The Holocaust and Colonialism’, in: 
Peter Hayes and John Roth (eds.) (2009), The Oxford Handbook of Holocaust Studies 
(Oxford). 
16 On the context, see: R. B. Edgerton (2002), The Troubled Heart of Africa: A History of 
the Congo (New York), 48 and 57. 
17 G. W. Stocking Jr. and K. Maclay, ‘Malinowski: Archetypes from the Dreamtime of 
Anthropology’, in: idem. (ed.) (1991), Colonial Situations: Essays on the 
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explorer Hermann Wissmann had already referred to these pan-European 
structures when in the early 1890s he dedicated his memoirs to King 
Leopold of Belgium for whom he felt ‘deepest gratitude’ for supporting 
his expeditions.18 One of the striking aspects of the ways in which these 
explorers described their experiences was the distinction between 
‘savages’ and ‘Europeans’. In the 1920s, Malinowski, too, referred to the 
relationship between the colonial actors and the natives in terms of 
‘European culture’ and ‘European education’, just as he later did during 
the Second World War. In the midst of this war, whose impact 
Malinowski noted with particular bitterness, the unity of European culture 
and identity continued to appear just as self-evident from his ‘African 
perspective’ as it had been twenty-five years earlier in the Pacific 
Islands.19 Anthropologists and the Colonial Office alike spoke of ‘the 
social adjustment of the primitive peoples of Africa to European 
Culture’.20 Fifteen years later, the ethnologist and heroine of the 
Résistance, Germaine Tillion, who sought to strengthen the bonds 
between Algerians and France through a new educational system, used a 
similar terminology, speaking of the ‘European’ culture and education that 
was to be spread across North Africa.21 On the military side, both French 
and British counter-insurgency officers simultaneously touted the forms 
of warfare that ‘the European’ should practice or avoid in Indochina and 
North Africa.22 
Convergence of experiences in non-European areas did obviously 
not automatically lead to ‘Europeanization’. The link between colonialism 
and Europeanization had clear boundaries. In the long term European 
settler communities demonstrated how the colonial exodus – with its new 
reference points and identities – led the settlers away from Europe and 
                                                                                                                                       
Contextualization of Ethnographic Knowledge (Madison), 9-74. On the anthropological 
contrastation between Europe and ‘the others’, see: T. Asad (ed.) (1973), Anthropology 
and the Colonial Encounter (London). 
H. Wissmann (1891), Im Innern Afrikas: Die Erforschung des Kassai während der Jahre 
1883, 1884 und 1885 (Leipzig) 
19 B. Malinowski (1943), ‘The Pan-African Problem of Culture Contact’, The American 
Journal of Sociology XLXIII, 649-665, quotation on p. 660. 
20  B. Mumford (1929), ‘Education and the Social Adjustment of the Primitive Peoples of 
Africa to European Culture’, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute II, 
138-161. 
21 G. Tillion (1959), L'Afrique bascule vers l'avenir (Paris). 
22 R. Trinquier (1961), Guerre, Subversion, Révolution (Paris), 245; idem. (1961), La 
Guerre Modern : Ordre Du Jour (Paris). 
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towards new structures that were neither ‘colonial’ nor ‘European’. The 
development of distinct identities in the United States, Canada, South 
Africa, New Zealand or Australia represents the clearest examples. From 
the perspective of the search for European convergences and formative, 
collective European experiences it is nevertheless debatable whether these 
emigrant groups were actually ‘lost’ to Europe in the late nineteenth 
century, as various European nations discussed with growing concern.23 
Even in the United States, the inhabitants of European origin still 
represent around 74 per cent of the population. In all former white settler 
colonies, powerful links to Europe endure. Even today, these populations 
stand apart - socially as well as politically - from groups of non-European 
backgrounds. This is as true in South America as in Australia and the 
United States.24 
If we regard shared experiences as a key aspect of 
‘Europeanization’, then the settler colonies are of particular relevance. 
The worlds in which the settlers lived can be described as mixed European 
‘special zones of experiences’.25 Three characteristics of this settler 
culture seem particularly relevant for the subject of Europeanization: first, 
there is the transnational, mostly pan-European composition of the settler 
colonies. Secondly, one would have to investigate the ways in which the 
settlers systematically distinguished themselves from the ‘natives’. 
Overseas, the internal European boundaries, which were so clearly 
delineated on the continent, tended to fade in importance. What was 
regarded as ‘European’ and what was not appeared to be far more evident 
from the perspective of the settlers abroad than in the European capitals. 
A third characteristic of European settlements in colonial contexts is the 
‘frontier situation’ in which settlers were bound together by fear of real or 
imagined ‘enemy natives’. The ‘thin white line’ of European settlers, who 
were in a minority position everywhere, could always be crushed in an 
                                                
23 S. Conrad (2006), Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen Kaiserreich (Munich: 
C.H. Beck), 229-278. 
24 S. P. Huntington (2004), Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity 
(New York) and idem. and L. E. Harrison (2000), Culture Matters: How Values Shape 
Human Progress (New York). 
25 D. van Laak (2004), ‘Kolonien als “Laboratorien der Moderne”?’, in: S. Conrad and J. 
Osterhammel (eds.), Das Kaiserreich transnational: Deutschland in der Welt 1871-1914 
(Göttingen), 257-279, here 266-7. D. Cannadine (2002), Ornamentalism: How the British 
Saw Their Empire (London). 
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instant during the next uprising.26 In these fragile ‘Islands of White’, the 
boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was defined along the colour bar, not 
necessarily along ‘national’ lines.27 The new ‘we’ group was therefore 
made up of Europeans who transcended national differences. They came 
defined their shared identity against the indigenous population and 
invented legal codes and conventions designed to separate the groups. In 
one recorded case of the 1890s, Indians living in African colonies were 
explicitly required to salute ‘Europeans’ whenever they encountered 
them.28 African uprisings were interpreted as attacks on ‘European 
civilization’ represented by the white settlers.29 The metaphor of the trek 
and the laager, with which the nationally heterogeneous settlers conquered 
and subdued colonial spaces and joined forces in violent attacks on the 
‘savages’, accurately describes the process of transnational ‘European’ 
identity-building in the colonies. 
For one of the largest European settler cultures in Africa, the 
settler community in Algeria, which consisted of shopkeepers, craftsmen 
and merchants from France, Spain, Italy, Malta, Switzerland and 
Germany, there was a special term: ‘pieds-noirs’.30 In most contemporary 
sources (both French and Arab), these settlers were commonly referred to 
as ‘Europeans’ and not as Frenchmen. Their living quarters in Algerian 
towns and cities were known as ‘European quarters’.31 The Algerian 
independence movement, the FLN, targeted ‘European’ facilities as part 
of its technique of urban terror. As it stated in the summer of 1956: 
‘Descendez n’importe quel Européen, de dix-huit à cinquante-quatre ans. 
                                                
26 A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (1980), ‘The Thin White Line’, African Affairs, LXXIX, 25-44. 
27 D. Kennedy (1987), Islands of White, Settler Society and Culture in Kenya and 
Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1939 (Durham), 11-31, 128-146. C. Elkins/Susan Pedersen 
(2005), Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies (New 
York and London: Routledge).  
28 T. von Prince (1914), Gegen Araber und Wahehe: Erinnerungen aus meiner 
afrikanischen Leutnantszeit 1890-1895 (Berlin), 3. 
29 C. Elkins and S. Pedersen (2005, ‘Introduction: Settler Colonialism: A Concept and Its 
Uses’, in: idem. (eds.), Settler Colonialism, 1-20. For Britain: S. Constantine (1999), 
‘Migrants and Settlers’, in: W.R. Louis (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire 
(Oxford and New York), 163-187. 
30 D. Leufeuvre (2004), ‘Les pieds-noirs’, in: M. Harbi and B. Stora, La Guerre 
d’Algérie 1954-2004: La fin de l’amnésie (Paris), 267-286. 
31 G. Pervillé (2004), ‘Pour en finir avec les “Pieds-Noirs”, Bordeaux, January 2004: 
http://guy.perville.free.fr/spip/article.php3?id_article=34 [10.7.2008]. P. Mannoni 
(1993), Les français d’Algérie: Vie, mœurs, mentalités (Paris). 
Gerwarth / Malinowski, Europeanization through Violence? 
 10 
Pas de femmes, pas d’enfants, pas de vieux.’32 In its tracts, the threat of 
‘représailles terribles s’abattront sur la population civile européenne’ 
pointed to a line of conflict where ‘Europeans’ could become collective 
targets. 33 This dichotomy, which blurred the internal differences between 
Europeans, could also be found in many decolonisation manifestoes 
within Europe itself. Jean-Paul Sartre’s famous preface to Frantz Fanon’s 
Wretched of the Earth, for example, was not addressed to his fellow 
Frenchmen, but explicitly to ‘the Europeans’.34 
Frontier and laager mentalities produced solidarity towards fellow 
Europeans and aggressive exclusion of and violence towards the ‘native 
other’. The parallel, sometimes joint European penetration of the non-
European world led to a continually expanding European ‘settler archive’ 
where experiences of colonial rule were stored and accessed.35 This was 
reflected in transnational distinctions between Europeans and natives that 
were evolving in the fields of criminal law and voting rights as well as in 
the construction of a new ethnic category: ‘Europeanness’.36 The 
introduction of such a new ethnic category was sanctioned by ‘scientific 
findings’ which offered ‘proof’ for racial differences. The German 
anatomist, Frederick Tiedemann, for example, pointed out in a lecture at 
the Royal Society in London that the brain of the ‘negro’ was more 
similar to that of an Orang-Utan than to the brain of a European.  ‘The 
principal result of my researches on the brain of the Negro, is, that neither 
anatomy nor physiology can justify our placing them beneath the 
Europans in a moral or intellectual point of view.’37 As with the closely 
related case of ‘scientific’ racism, which must also be understood as a 
                                                
32 As quoted in: G. Pervillé (2001), ‘Le terrorisme urbain dans la guerre d’Algérie (1954-
1962)’, in: J.-C. Jauffret and M. Vaisse (eds.), Militaires et guérilla dans la guerre 
d’Algérie (Paris), 447-467, quotation on p. 455. 
33 Ibid., 453. 
34 See Jean-Paul Sartre’s preface to: F. Fanon (1965), The Wretched of the Earth (New 
York). 
35 A term used by L. Veracini (2008), ‘Colonialism and Genocides: Towards an Analysis 
of the Settler Archive of the European Imagination’, in: A. D. Moses (ed.), Colony, 
Empire, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History 
(Oxford and New York), 148-161.  
36 B. Gammerl (2008), ‘Untertanen, Staatsbürger und andere. Der Umgang mit ethnischer 
Heterogenität im Britischen Weltreich und im Habsburgerreich, 1867-1918’, PhD thesis, 
FU Berlin, 103-152, 184-213. 
37 F. Tiedemann (1936), ‘On the Brain of the Negro, Compared with That of the 
European and the Orang-Outang’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of 
London 126, 497-527. 
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joint European invention,38 the creation of colonial legal norms was aimed 
at permanently separating Europeans and natives from one another by 
means of racial laws, marriage regulations, workplace regulations and 
colonial urban planning.39 
Although ‘counter-acculturation’ – the cultural and physical 
‘blending’ of European settlers and indigenous populations – was an 
important aspect of colonial life, it remained the exception whereas 
demarcation from the ‘natives’ became the rule in places wherever 
Europeans formed substantial minorities.40 This tendency greatly 
increased during the nineteenth century for a number of reasons, among 
which the rise of ‘scientific’ racism and increased immigration of 
European women (along with the greater sexual autarchy this entailed) 
were of particular importance.  
These patterns have not altogether disappeared. In the political 
rhetoric of conservative and nationalist politicians today, Europe’s borders 
have to be ‘defended’ against illegal immigrants from the former colonies 
in Africa. Although this campaign points to some general conclusions 
about European policy, the transformation process is most impressive 
among the radical intellectual right in France. Groups that once sought to 
maintain a French-dominated Algeria through violence have now formed 
organizations such as the Groupement de Recherche et d’Etudes pour la 
Civilisation Européenne. This intellectual circle, widely known by its 
revealing abbreviation, GRECE, is calling for the radical expulsion of all 
Arabs and Africans as well as the eradication of their cultural influences 
from France. In doing so, GRECE is also overcoming the traditional 
boundaries and concepts of French nationalism. It is no longer the 
integrity of France that is at stake but rather the ‘defence’ of European 
civilisation against the influence of the former colonies.41 The intellectuals 
                                                
38 See the short survey provided by: D. Claussen (1994/2007), Was heisst Rassismus? 
(Darmstadt and Munich). 
39 J. S. Furnivall (1944), Netherlands India: A Study of a Plural Economy (Cambridge); 
M. G. Smith (1965), The Plural Society in the British West Indies (Berkeley, Ca.); A. D. 
King (1976), Colonial Urban Development. Culture, Social Power and Environment 
(London); Z. Çelik (2008), Empire, Architecture, and the City: French-Ottoman 
Encounters, 1830-1914 (Seattle); idem. (1997), Urban Forms and Colonial 
Confrontations: Algiers under French Rule (Berkeley, Ca.). 
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of GRECE do not base their argument on the concept of the nation, but 
rather on the concept of culture: today’s Europe is a place where Africans 
and other ‘people of colour’ are not.42 The metaphor of the colonial laager 
springs to mind again. Now, however, it is being transported from the 
colonies into the context of European immigration policy. The frontier is 
shifting to the inside, while the threat from the colonial ‘other’ provides a 
rallying cry for a common European identity. 
Although we should be careful not to exaggerate the ‘boomerang’ 
argument while also seeking to maintain the sense of proportions 
frequently demanded by critics of transnational history,43 there is still 
abundant evidence that the dichotomy between Europeans and ‘natives’ in 
the colonies was imported back to Europe. This first applied to the 
returning settlers and their own culture of remembrance.44 Secondly, it 
also applies to those colonial officials, who returned to Europe after 
decolonization and who were frequently ‘recycled’ as experts for foreign 
policy or development aid.45 The continuities between colonial and post-
colonial projects, from European economic policy to foreign policy, were 
considerable. The example of the European Economic Community reveals 
how French, Belgian and Dutch colonial expertise was Europeanized and 
re-channelled, particularly in the context of EEC development aid. 46 
Alongside megalomaniac plans such as Hermann Sörgel’s Antlantropa 
project (which proposed to close the Straits of Gibraltar, to evaporate the 
                                                                                                                                       
Civilisation Européenne (GRECE)’, in: J.-P. Rioux and J.-F. Sirinelli, La guerre 
d’Algérie et les intellectuels français (Paris), 59-78. 
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Mediterranean and join Africa to Europe47) development aid projects 
provided a way of continuing European cooperation in the colonial 
sphere. In a rapidly changing international context, Europeans now sought 
to present themselves as ‘developers’ of other continents, particularly of 
Africa.48 At the time of its founding, the EEC consisted predominantly of 
sovereign colonial powers (some of which were still embroiled in colonial 
wars), which had explicitly included the ‘development’ of their overseas 
territories in the organisation’s founding statutes. 49 
Systematic mutual observation, collaboration and transnational 
learning processes were, however, in no way limited to peaceful 
development policy. As far as the very similar forms of colonial wars, 
European concentration camps in the colonies, racism and the 
organization of European dominance were concerned, these processes ran 
largely parallel to the much more intensively researched development of a 
European civil society.50 A new collection of essays on the topic of 
colonial wars reveals how powerfully images of the self and the enemy 
‘other’, and also concepts of warfare, have resembled one another over the 
centuries and from one European nation to the next.51 The violence 
unleashed by Europeans in the colonial sphere revealed the same 
structures in each case: asymmetrical warfare, the deployment of auxiliary 
forces, the division of indigenous populations into ‘hostile’ and ‘friendly 
tribes’, the expulsion and killing of civilians, the construction of 
concentration camps since the end of the nineteenth century, and the 
systematic use of means of warfare outlawed in Europe, such as torture 
and poison gas bombs, which the Spanish used in Morocco a few years 
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before Mussolini’s air force did the same in Ethiopia.52 Systematic mutual 
observation and transnational learning processes are also well documented 
for the simultaneous wars of decolonization in Kenya and Algeria were 
Britain and France attempted to learn from each other’s 
‘counterinsurgency lessons’.53 Officers, soldiers and institutions were 
encouraged to learn from the anti-guerrilla warfare of other European 
nations and in the 1950s and 1960s, European knowledge and information 
transfers in this area were extremely intense.54 Recent debates on colonial 
massacres have raised the question of whether a special type of European 
‘colonial warrior’ developed in the nineteenth and twentieth century, but 
this has yet to be systematically examined. 55 
As in the late-colonial wars, there was also similar European 
cooperation in regard to the coordination and defence of European 
interests in the ex-colonies. As late as in 1960, English diplomats referred 
to talks ‘with our colonial colleagues’56 whenever they held coordinating 
meetings with France, Belgium and Portugal. During the violent conflicts 
in the Congo, these powers coordinated their position prior to the UN 
general assembly meeting on the issue. The diplomats took great pains to 
hide the true nature of their discussions. ‘It would be most unfortunate’, 
one British diplomat wrote to his colleague, ‘if news of the talks leaked 
out; they would look like a conspiracy of European colonial powers in 
                                                
52 U Mücke, ‘Agonie einer Kolonialmacht: Spaniens Krieg in Marokko (1921-1927)’, in: 
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55 See the ongoing PhD project by Christoph Jens Kamissek (EUI Florence), 
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und im frühen 20. Jahrhundert’. 
56 On the Quadripartite Talks on Africa (here 1957-1960) in Lissabon, Paris, London and 
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face of the United Nations resolution on the Congo.’57 What this example 
illustrates is that up until the late 1960s, colonialism remained firmly 
based on continuing contacts between the European colonial masters, 
contacts that existed alongside tensions at the level of high politics.  
The wars of decolonisation also created tensions between Europe 
and the United States, since European cooperation in the colonial sphere 
frequently collided with Washington’s anti-colonial rhetoric.58 John F. 
Kennedy’s famous congressional speech against imperialism, for 
example, in which he referred to the colonial misdeeds of France and the 
USSR, likewise bore witness to a European-American confrontation that - 
at least in certain situations - helped to forge a common European front.59 
The severe crisis following the violent commando operation on the Suez 
Canal in 1956 is the best-known example of this.60 
Just as the European powers confronted one another in the colonial 
arena, they also cooperated in staking colonial claims. These claims 
usually entailed a coordination of exploitation and a mutual toleration of 
violence, even in places where this violence assumed genocidal 
proportions. At the Berlin Africa Conference of 1884/85, for example, the 
diplomats not only divided Africa and planned the joint exploitation of the 
Congo but also signed an agreement that in the event of a European war, 
the combatants would not deploy any ‘coloured’ troops.61 This form of 
segregation also dovetailed with the spatially limited effectiveness of The 
Hague Land War Convention or the Kellog-Briand Pact, whose rules for 
civilised warfare and the proscription of war were conceived for Europe 
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and not for the colonies.62 When these conventions were perceived to have 
been violated, for example in the case of Germany’s ill-fated attempts to 
instigate in late 1914 a Jihad in the Near East against French and British 
colonial troops, 63 Swiss missionaries protested vigorously against this 
breech of European conventions not to employ ‘savages’ against white 
soldiers.64 The German response to the Allies’ use of colonial troops and, 
more importantly, to France’s and Belgium’s decision to deploy more 
than 20,000 black colonial troops during the occupation of the Rhineland 
after the Great War was similarly met with horror (across all political and 
religious divides) about this ‘violation’ of European norms of warfare.65  
On other occasions, however, Europeans co-operated militarily in 
various colonial ‘trouble spots’. The brutal crushing of the Boxer 
Rebellion by the Eight Nations Alliance illustrates the fact that despite 
prevailing tensions in the colonial sphere, Western powers were willing to 
co-operate when they felt that their common interests were threatened. 
Despite the arguably global alliance which militarily intervened in China 
and which saw the German General Alfred von Waldersee entering 
Beijing alongside the Bengalese cavalry of the British colonial army, 
European collaboration remained at the heart of the Boxer expedition and 
demonstrated that inner-European rivalries and conflicts could be 
transcended when common European interests were felt to be threatened 
in the colonial realm.66 
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The transcendence of inner-European boundaries in colonial 
settings and the pooling of forces against a common enemy were two of 
the forms in which colonialism had fundamentally ‘Europeanizing’ 
effects. The second area that we will now examine also concerns violence, 
but this time it is violence between Europeans. 
 
III 
 
The Great War and its immediate aftermath had a seemingly paradoxical 
effect on Europe: on the one hand, it obviously reinforced the 
fragmentation of the continent and increased national tensions to a 
previously unknown extent. The first age of economic globalisation came 
to an abrupt end while close cultural and dynastic ties that had existed 
between the combatants right up until 1914 ceased to exist and were 
replaced by mutual hostility, suspicion and massively fortified borders.67 
In that respect, the Great War certainly served as one of the key factors of 
de-Europeanization in the twentieth-century. On the other hand, however, 
the Great War also prompted international debates about European 
identity and Europe’s future place in the world on a historically 
unprecedented scale. Alongside the birth of ultra-nationalist movements 
across Europe, intellectuals all over the continent embarked on an 
intensified search for ideas of inner-European collaboration and, in some 
cases, even European unity.68 The League of Nations, originally designed 
as a global institution, turned out to be distinctively European in terms of 
its outlook and the distribution of power within its key agencies after the 
US Senate refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty. Most of the issues the 
League dealt with – from refugees, to minority questions, and European 
reconstruction - had been raised by the Great War and demanded a 
Europeanized response articulated and implemented by a genuinely 
Europeanized civil service, the Secretariat.69 The League also provided 
the stage on which some of the most daring plans for European 
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reconciliation and integration – those articulated by Stresemann and 
Briand – were first presented. To be sure, the initiatives for closer 
European collaboration presented by Stresemann and Briand came to 
nought. Young Europeanist movements of the 1920s that grew out of the 
circles around Romain Rolland, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Tomas 
Masaryck, Ortega y Gasset and others could not dispell dominant 
nationalist sentiments. Yet, their ideas, triggered by the destruction of 
what Stefan Zweig called the World of Yesterday70 and the subsequent 
search for a new European order lived on in the second post-war period of 
the twentieth century.71 
 More immediately, and on the level of pan-European experiences, 
the Great War and its immediate aftermath created spaces for intensified 
transnational personal encounters and exchanges, not only between anti-
war Dadaists in Zurich’s Cabaret Voltaire, but also between soldiers of 
different national backgrounds who fought on the same side. The war 
itself highly intensified transnational mobility and created pan-European 
networks that survived the end of hostilities in November 1918. The 
wartime alliance of Germany, Austria and Hungary, for example, lived on 
in paramilitary networks of the extreme right as well as clandestine 
attempts to establish, in the mid-1920s and again in the 1930s, a ‘White 
International’ which was to be based in neutral Switzerland and to include 
representatives of both the defeated and the victorious states of Europe 
bound together in their anti-Communist beliefs. In this context, the ‘future 
of Europe’ was a prime concern, as Waldemar Papst, responsible for the 
murderer of Rosa Luxemburg, long-serving military organizer of the 
Austrian Heimwehr and author of the White International’s manifesto 
phrased it.  What exactly this ‘future Europe’ of ultra-nationalists was to 
look like was a divisive question consciously avoided by Papst who 
confined himself to stating that the ultimate European mission of the 
White International was ‘the replacement of the old trinity of the French 
Revolution [liberté, egalité, fraternité], […] with a new trinity: authority, 
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order, and justice.72  
 The Russian and Hungarian Bolshevik revolutions simultaneously 
created sizeable refugee communities in cities such as Vienna, Prague, 
Berlin and London, where tens of thousands of disgruntled and uprooted 
counterrevolutionaries from Russia or Hungary had to adapt to new lives 
whilst seeking support from like-minded Europeans for their various plots 
to bring about the downfall of international Communism.73  
 The Great War and its violent aftershocks between 1917 and 1923 
also produced a large number of European adventurers who travelled the 
battlefields of post-war Europe from Anatolia to Upper Silesia, civil-war 
torn Russia and the Baltic States in search of violent action, material gain 
or ideological fulfilment. For the British Black and Tan whose violent 
journey led from the trenches of Flanders to post-war Ireland and 
Palestine, or those ex-officers of the former Central Powers who joined 
forces with Russia’s White Armies, fought with (and against) Baltic 
nationalists in Lithuania before assuming ‘advisory’ roles in Ataturk’s 
ethnic cleansing campaigns in Anatolia, l’Europe vécue was a Europe of 
violence.74 Adoration for violence, newly radicalised and genuinely pan-
European forms of anti-Semitism as well as war-induced notions of 
masculinity, served as trans-national touchstones for these movements and 
formed the basis of unlikely alliances and even friendships. After the 
temporary stabilization in European politics, this social type resurfaced in 
the 1930s. During the Spanish Civil War, both sides of the conflict were 
backed by considerable numbers of international volunteers: with up to 
75,000 Italians, 19,000 Germans and around 700 of Eoin O’Duffy’s Irish 
Blueshirts fighting on Franco’s side and up to 30,000 foreign nationals, 
the vast majority of them Europeans, joining the Republican International 
Brigades75, the Spanish Civil War provided a pan-European stage for 
violent encounters and transnational solidarity, so vividly described in 
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countless memoirs and the literary accounts of André Malraux, Arthur 
Koestler, and George Orwell.76 All of these accounts emphasise the 
peculiar experiences of transnational co-operation on both sides of the 
Spanish Civil War, experiences and encounters prompted by conflict. 
Although the Spanish Civil War was undoubtedly a highly divisive event, 
divisions did not follow national lines.  
 The Europeanisation of conflict and (generally) involuntary trans-
nationalisation of violent experiences was taken to its extreme during the 
Nazi war of conquest after 1939. Under the auspices of radical racial and 
social inequality, Nazi policies triggered a historically unprecedented 
wave of involuntary transnational experiences that were shared by 
millions of soldiers and civilians, refugees and POWs.77 During the 
Second World War, for example, between 8 and 10 million forced 
labourers worked in Germany. By 1944, one out of three workers in the 
German armaments industry and one quarter of the workforce in the 
machine-building and chemical industries were foreigners.78 These 
extreme experiences obviously did not turn Poles and Czechs into 
Europeans, but for many of them, the change of place reconfigured the 
perception of nationhood and nationality; sometimes radicalizing earlier 
notions, sometimes destabilizing and modifying them. This is particularly 
true for the pan-European phenomena of resistance and collaboration. In 
his acclaimed novel, Éducation européenne, published in 1945, for 
example, the Lithuanian Jew Romain Gary tells the story of the 14-year-
old Polish boy Janek Twardovski, who joins a underground resistance 
movement near Wilno after his parents have been murdered by the 
Germans. The group is a motley crew that includes Russians, Ukrainians, 
Belorussians, Jews and Poles. Surrounded by a world of most extreme 
violence, the highly different members of the resistance group manage to 
abandon their national prejudices and develop a transnational identity. In a 
key scene, one of the protagonists points out: ‘Le patriotisme, c’est 
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l’amour des siens. Le nationalisme, c’est la haine des autres. [...] Il y a une 
grande fraternité qui se prépare dans le monde, les allemands nous auront 
valu au moins ça...’79 Gary’s interpretation of transnational encounters as 
an unintended result of German force was partly informed by his own 
war-induced life experiences as an author born in (then Russian) Lithuania 
and educated in France who served as a fighter pilot for the Free French 
during the Second World War. But Gary’s notions of Europeanization 
through violence were also mirrored in the memoirs of other members of 
the European resistance.80  
 The war indeed created new European communities of émigrés in 
North and South America, Australia and London which became the new 
home of various European governments-in-exile, providing for Belgian, 
Czech, Slovak, French, Luxemburgish, French, Greek, Norwegian, Dutch, 
Polish and Yugoslav exile communities in addition to Jewish refugees 
from Germany and other occupied territories.81 While the shared 
experiences of European exile could reinforce nationalism to the extreme, 
it also prompted new ways of thinking about European identity. War and 
destruction thus stimulated new forms of interaction between different 
European resistance groups and radicalized earlier plans for European 
integration.82 In 1942, for example, the committed anti-fascist Austrian 
refugee, Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer, formerly a prominent figure in the 
League of Nations, suggested that the destructiveness of Hitler’s New 
Order had actually been helpful in making Europeans more European. 
Without intending to do, Hitler had destroyed the ‘myth of sovereignty’ 
and accustomed Europeans to think beyond their national borders.83 To be 
sure, not everyone would have agreed with such sentiments in 1942, but 
there is certainly some truth in Mark Mazower’s argument that ‘Nazi 
conquest linked together the peoples of Europe more tightly than they had 
ever been connected before’ and that in turn, ‘those fighting the Germans 
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also found it necessary to plan in European terms.’84 Both Nazi and Allied 
propaganda invoked images of transnational European solidarity to bolster 
their war effort, a fact that the Italian historian Federico Chabod 
commented on his Storia dell’idea Europa which he started to work on 
during the war: ‘in these last years there has been and still is much talk of 
Europe and European civilization and so on. Appeals, articles in 
newspapers and magazines, discussions and polemics: in all, the word 
‘Europe’ has been tossed around with unusual frequency, for good reasons 
and bad.’85 
If Nazism appeared to most contemporaries to be the very opposite 
of ‘European civilisation’, Hitler’s crusade against Bolshevism also 
appealed to many conservative and fascist Europeans who rallied to the 
anti-Soviet cause. At the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, in June 
1941, some 600,000 non-German volunteers fought alongside Nazi 
Germany against the Soviet Union. At the height of the Second World 
War, in 1943, every third soldier defending the German lines was in fact a 
non-German volunteer. In the spring of 1945, half of the roughly one 
million members of the SS were non-Germans from 15 different European 
nations. Romanians, Finns, Lithuanians, Latvians, Ukrainians, 
Hungarians, Spaniards, Belgians, Swedes, and Norwegians made Hitler’s 
army very ‘European’ indeed.86 Nazi efforts to ‘Europeanize’ the German 
armed forces were intensified immediately after the defeat at Stalingrad. 
Nazi propaganda labelled Operation Barbarossa a ‘crusade for Europe’ in 
order to mobilise non-German Europeans for the fight against the 
perceived ‘Asian’ threat of Bolshevism on the one hand and against 
American materialism and imperialism on the other. A new ‘Song for 
Europe’ was broadcast, stamps with the slogan ‘European United Front 
against Bolshevism’ were issued and Nazi propaganda maintained that 
‘born out of discord, struggle and misery the United States of Europe has 
at last become a reality.’87 The Europeanization of evil found its most 
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internationally recognizable form in the pan-European figure of the 
collaborator, the Vidkun Quislings, Léon Degrelles, Pierre Lavals, Anton 
Musserts, Andrey Vlasovs, Emanuel Moravecs, Eoin O’Duffys and 
William Joyces of Europe.88 To be sure, their aspirations for ‘Europe’ 
often differed substantially from the place in Hitler’s New Order which 
the German authorities were willing to grant them. They had to experience 
first hand that the Nazis’ ‘Europe’ was a German Europe and that 
nationalism provided a major obstacle to the realisation of a political 
union of European fascists. But the Nazis’ ability to forge a genuinely 
Europeanized community of fascists (however short-lived it may have 
been) was certainly remarkable. 
Absolute destruction could thus go hand in hand with very intense 
forms of international encounter, which fundamentally reshaped the lives 
of millions of Europeans. The horrors of the Nazi concentration camps are 
an example discussed elsewhere in this volume.89 Another example, the 
case of Berlin in the spring and summer of 1945 illustrates how a city 
devastated by war became a stage for European encounters triggered and 
characterised by violence, a stage on which hundreds of thousands of 
civilians, soldiers, refugees, POWs, and forced labourers from virtually 
every European country engaged with each other in various ways amidst 
an epic nightmare of violence and destruction.90 
Any analysis of the paradoxical relationship between violence and 
Europeanization would also have to discuss how transnational experiences 
of war, expulsion and destruction were remembered and transformed into 
‘lessons’ for European integration. Whereas war commemoration and 
hero cults after the Great War primarily served as a source for nationalist 
mobilization,91 (even though its forms, notably the cult of the Unknown 
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Soldier and medievalist forms of monuments, followed transnational 
patterns92) the same cannot be said about the post-1945 period. 
Commemoration of the Second World War soon focussed on European 
reconciliation as the only possible lesson to be learnt from the war. 
Increasingly, the suffering caused by war and conflict was emphasised as 
a shared European experience. It was this perspective which made certain 
transnational forms of commemoration possible: from the erection of the 
Cross of Coventry on top of the reconstructed Dresden Frauenkirche to 
the repeated meetings between François Mitterand and his fellow war 
veteran, Ernst Jünger, and Helmut Kohl’s visit to Verdun and his 
attendance at the commemoration ceremonies on the beaches of 
Normandy.  
To be sure, neither the civilian populations of Coventry and 
Dresden nor the German and French soldiers at Verdun had any desire to 
die for Europeanization. It is in retrospect, prompted by the need to make 
sense of what appeared to survivors as a non-sensical conflict and to heal 
the wounds of fundamentally divisive events, that these events have 
developed a distinctively Europeanizing effect.93 This trend continues to 
the present day. In the recent Brussels-based exhibition, ‘50 Years of the 
European Adventure’, for example, the Museum of Europe presented a 
girl’s dress made of Allied flags, the illustrated memoirs of a young 
Hungarian in Budapest in 1956, a British soldier’s diary kept during the 
Suez crisis and Stasi memorabilia as objects ‘which tell us in a moving 
way what Europeans have experienced over the last 50 years.’94 The focus 
on civilians’ suffering allowed for a commemorative perspective in which 
the experience of violence, expulsions, and bombing terror could 
retrospectively be interpreted as a source for Europeanization through the 
convergence of experiences.95 
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IV 
 
 
For obvious reasons, the term Europeanization is most frequently used to 
describe processes of positive change, integration and peaceful 
convergence within the historical realm that has become today’s European 
Union. There is certainly nothing wrong with emphasizing the legacy of 
the Enlightenment and Christianity, religious tolerance, or the integrating 
effects of European trade and cultural exchanges as crucial factors in the 
process of Europeanization. What has been argued in this essay, however, 
is that any analysis of ‘Europeanization’ would be incomplete if it ignored 
the processes of unintended convergence of life experiences of millions of 
Europeans brought about by war and conflict.  
War, the destruction of whole cities, of national certainties, and of 
traditional forms of identity were common experiences for most 
Europeans. It may not be an accident that the construction of a distinctly 
European identity occurred in direct response to some of the most violent 
aspects of European history. Pan-Europeanism tended to remain on the 
political margins until the era of the two world wars and ideas for 
European integration were only implemented after periods of extreme, 
self-destructive violence.96  
If large-scale violence in Europe and Europe’s colonial 
possessions did produce convergent life experiences, trans-national 
learning processes and forms of emulation, the construction of a collective 
war memory in recent decades has also helped to turn originally divisive 
events into a shared legacy of Europeans, in which human suffering, 
irrespective of national contexts, is emphasized more strongly than 
immediately after 1945. In this meta-narrative of European identity, 
colonialism and the two world wars have become constant reminders that 
the Europe of the future has learnt the lessons of the past. For all these 
reasons, war and conflict should not be understood as the opposite of 
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convergence, unification and compromise, but as an integral part of the 
complicated dynamics of Europeanization.97  
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